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Our midterm elections are widely viewed as a referendum on the administration’s performance, with 12 Senate seats and all 317 House seats up for grabs. The 2025 elections show that while discontent towards China continues to feature prominently in public discourse, it was ultimately overshadowed by larger political dynamics that dominate national attention.
This is the case despite efforts from the current Marcos administration to elevate localized China threat issues as a key campaign concern. In the end, of the 11 Senate candidates endorsed by the government, only four solid administration allies secured sure seats, signaling President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s waning influence.
China’s absence in Philippine polls
Filipino public sentiment towards China has long been overwhelmingly negative, with distrust and fear deeply embedded in the national psyche. In the lead-up to the national elections, 75% of Filipinos expressed support for candidates who would take a firm stand in defending the country’s rights in the West Philippine Sea.
Yet, despite this strong nationalist sentiment, none of the 12 winning Senate candidates ran openly on an anti-China platform. While some administration bets occasionally voiced support for a more assertive stance against China, these positions ultimately took a back seat to more pressing domestic concerns, such as food security, inflation control, and, most prominently, the push to consolidate “unity” against political rivals. For example, Senate Majority Leader Francis Tolentino — who had recently alleged Chinese interference in Philippine elections and championed the landmark Philippine Maritime Zones Law passed last November — failed to secure his reelection.
Meanwhile, non-administration bets who are closely allied with the Duterte family were not punished in the polls for their distinct pro-China stances. Incumbent congressman Rodante Marcoleta sparked controversy when he previously dismissed the West Philippine Sea as a mere Filipino “creation” — a remark widely seen as downplaying the country’s legal claims. Yet Marcoleta ranked sixth place in the Senate race.
Other Duterte allies — such as Bong Go, Ronald dela Rosa, and Imee Marcos — have been reelected to the Senate despite their long-standing support for former president Rodrigo Duterte’s China-friendly policies.
Despite earlier predictions that China’s growing assertiveness would figure well in the midterm elections, actual and real concerns of Filipinos towards Beijing did not manifest in the national votes. This points to more complex trends at play, with domestic political realities hitting closer to home, shaped in part by feuding political dynasties and the evolving character of the country’s growing electorate. And these may well influence how the country’s China policy will change in the future.
Duterte rising, Marcos stumbling
Since the start of the campaign, President Marcos has framed the midterm elections as a choice between his vision of good governance and the contentious legacies of former president Duterte, which included the latter’s well-known China pivot. Indeed, the midterm elections are not only a head-on clash between the once-unified camps of the Marcos and the Duterte families, but also a referendum on President Marcos’s policies and, ultimately, his decision to break from the China-friendly Dutertes.
Six of the eleven Alyansa candidates secured Senate seats in this year’s elections, but two of them —incumbent Senator Pia Cayetano and Las Piñas congresswoman Camille Villar — have been known to openly support the Dutertes.
Taken together, failure to secure a clear majority in the Senate reflects growing public dissatisfaction towards the sitting Marcos administration, especially when compared with the historically strong midterm performances of past presidents. Former president Duterte secured nine out of 12 Senate seats for his administration slate in the 2019 midterms — a feat likewise achieved by his predecessor, the late President Benigno Aquino III, in 2013.
Meanwhile, five of the 12 Senate candidates personally endorsed by Vice President Sara Duterte were successful in the polls. This is an impressive jump from early survey predictions of just two sure-win seats for the Duterte camp. The results carry high political stakes for her as VP Duterte faces a looming impeachment trial. Her political future, not only as Vice President but, more importantly, as a potential 2028 presidential contender, rests in the Senate’s support. An acquittal would require her to secure the support of at least one-third of the 24-member chamber — something that, given her camp’s showing in this election, now appears well within reach.
The midterm election results are a testament to the enduring influence of the Dutertes, even with their patriarch awaiting trial at The Hague and an imminent political battle threatening to displace Vice President Sara Duterte.
The Dutertes’ resilience means that Marcos’s attempt to rebrand himself as an anti-establishment leader, with a more confrontational stance on China at its core, failed to resonate with the Filipino electorate.
Genuine opposition making a comeback
With 55.87 million turnout voters, this year’s midterm elections were the largest in Philippine history, made more notable by Millennials and Gen Z voters making up 60% of the electorate. The youth not only turned out to vote, but they also breathed new life into what appears to be a reinvigorated “genuine opposition” in Philippine politics.
Former senators Bam Aquino and Francis Pangilinan, both prominent allies of the late President Aquino, now stand in sharp contrast to the Duterte-Marcos rivalry after securing two seats in the Senate polls. Alongside this tandem, Akbayan — known for its anti-Marcos, anti-Duterte, and anti-China positions — topped the party-list race, making them eligible for three seats in the House of Representatives.
The resurgence of a genuine opposition tied to the Aquino-era leadership signals a potential shift in Philippine politics. This bloc, which historically championed more assertive China policies, such as the 2013 South China Sea arbitration, could weaken the chances of a pro-China Duterte resurgence in the 2028 elections. Their power lies in their young supporters, who also happen to be the most vocal against Beijing’s overall rising influence in the country.
Barring any significant shifts from this reviving camp, the genuine opposition’s surprise victory gives them the momentum to consolidate and capitalize on the political controversies and questionable performances of the two feuding dynasties, especially on the issue of China’s growing influence in the country. Their consistent anti-China position, steadfast amidst changing political loyalties, could translate the country’s deep-seated China mistrust into actual votes come future elections.
Overall, the underwhelming performance of Marcos’ Alyansa slate in the midterm elections, despite the administration’s embrace of clear anti-China policies, underscores a persistent truth in Philippine politics: foreign policy still takes a back seat to the realities of domestic politics. Meanwhile, the political offensive against the Vice President may have backfired, allowing her to claim victimhood and strengthen her bloc in the Senate.
The Dutertes’ potential return to power carries serious implications for China’s standing in the Philippines, especially as the China question continues to divide the Marcos and Duterte camps. But whether that return becomes inevitable — or is halted by a rising, youth-driven opposition — will also depend on how the Marcos administration navigates its final three years. – Rappler.com
Enrico V. Gloria is an assistant professor of international relations (on study leave ) at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, and a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University. He writes about China’s rise, the bilateral relationship between China and the Philippines, as well as their respective foreign policies.
